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Employment Agreements
By Richard Moberly
and John Hutchins

Long-Term Employment Agreements With
In-House Counsel: Employment Security or
Ethical Quagmire?

T

he relationship between a company and its in-house corporate counsel
involves a fragile mixture of the corporate counsel’s fiduciary obligations
as the company’s attorney and the company’s legal and contractual respon-

sibilities as the attorney’s employer. Although these roles and expectations often blend
smoothly, the relationship can become problematic when the corporate counsel’s position as an attorney conflicts with the counsel’s status as an employee. Put another way,
when a company’s expectations as a client are at odds with its responsibilities as an
employer, the relationship between the employer-client and the employee-attorney can
become strained and expose each to difficulty, if not liability.

One situation that may breed such tension occurs when an in-house attorney enters
into a long-term employment contract with an employer-client. In a typical attorneyclient relationship between a company and its outside counsel, the client may terminate
its relationship with its attorney at any point.1 The attorney would be entitled to quantum meruit, or payment for services rendered, but the attorney would not be entitled to
payment for loss of future fees, even if the client already agreed to such payment.2 In
this situation, the law gives priority to the client’s right as the beneficiary of a fiduciary
relationship with its attorney to terminate the relationship (the client’s “beneficiary
rights”).
A long-term employment contract with a corporate or in-house counsel, however,
involves subtle, but important, differences. Depending on how such a contract is structured and the current state of the law in the jurisdiction at issue, in-house counsel may
have an argument that the contract obligates the client to a continued employment relationship, even if the client desires to terminate the attorney-client relationship. If true, this
would infringe upon the client’s ability to terminate its relationship with its attorney
immediately (or without future consequence). Enforcing this type of contract would
implicitly value an attorney’s contractual rights more than a client’s beneficiary rights.
Thus, when an in-house counsel enters into a long-term employment contract with a
client, a tension is created between the client’s beneficiary rights and the attorney’s contractual rights. This article addresses two issues that may arise as a result of this tension.
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First, it is unresolved in Georgia
whether long-term employment
contracts are enforceable by inhouse counsel through a breach of
contract action. In Georgia,
“express contracts between attorney and client as to compensation
are generally recognized.”3 At the
same time, it is also the state’s public policy that “a client has the
absolute right to discharge the
attorney and terminate the relation
at any time, even without cause.”4
At the intersection of these two
competing forces are long-term
employment contracts for in-house
counsel. For example, a long-term
contract that provides for a significant severance benefit should the
employment be terminated prematurely may arguably limit the ability of a corporation to terminate the
attorney’s employment. Whether a
discharged in-house attorney may
succeed in a breach of contract

action against a former employer is
entirely dependent upon whether
this type of contract is enforceable.
Second, if a general counsel is
permitted to bring a breach of contract action against an employerclient, the limits on the attorney’s
ability to use the client’s own confidential information against the
client in that litigation are somewhat murky. This issue has been
hotly debated in other jurisdictions
in the context of wrongful discharge claims, but the issues are
relevant even in a breach of contract action. Georgia’s Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6 provides
some guidance, in that it only permits an attorney to reveal a client’s
confidential information if the
attorney reasonably believes it is
necessary “to establish a claim or
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer
and the client.”5 In application,

however, that standard can be difficult to apply, particularly in the
context of an attorney taking the
offensive against a client based
upon a breach of contract claim.
Unfortunately, neither of these
issues is resolved easily under current Georgia law, which should be
unsettling to Georgia’s in-house
counsel and their clients alike.

THE ENFORCEABILITY OF A
LONG-TERM
EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT FOR
GEORGIA’S INHOUSE COUNSEL
Two seminal Georgia cases dominate the issue of the enforceability
of a long-term employment con-

tract between a company and its inhouse counsel: Henson v. American
Family Corp.6 and AFLAC, Inc. v.
Williams.7 These cases, however,
reach differing conclusions regarding the balance between a company’s beneficiary rights as a client
and an attorney’s contractual rights
as an employee.

Henson v. American
Family Corp.:
Contracts Should Be
Enforced
In 1984, the Georgia Court of
Appeals determined that a discharged general counsel could
bring a breach of contract action
against his former employer under
a long-term retainer contract.8 In
Henson, a company and its general
counsel executed a ten-year
employment contract, “subject to
removal by action of the board [of
directors] at any time it shall be
deemed necessary.”9 Six years
later, the board removed the general counsel.10 As part of litigation
resulting from the termination, the
general counsel filed a breach of
contract claim to obtain the fee for
the remainder of his contract.11
In permitting the action to go forward, the Court of Appeals rejected
the company’s argument that such
a long-term retainer contract is
against public policy. Relying on a
1922 Georgia Supreme Court case,
the Court of Appeals stated that
express contracts between an attorney and client are generally recognized, even if the contemplated
services are not rendered.12 The
Henson Court stated that it was
aware of no public policy precluding the enforcement of such contracts.13 Therefore, although the
board of directors was permitted to
remove the general counsel, the
22

company was bound by the general
counsel’s contractual rights.14

AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams:
The Client Has the
Absolute Right to Fire
Its Attorney
The public policy apparently
hidden from the Henson Court was
identified a decade later by the
Georgia Supreme Court in AFLAC,
Inc. v. Williams.15 In AFLAC, the
Court held that a long-term retainer
contract for an outside counsel was
unenforceable because it contained
a penalty clause if the client prematurely terminated the contract.16
Under the contract in AFLAC, the
company paid an outside counsel a
monthly retainer under a sevenyear contract; however, if the company terminated the contract early,
even for good cause, it agreed to
pay “as damages an amount equal
to 50 percent of the sums due under
the remaining terms, plus renewal
of this agreement.”17
The Court relied upon important
public policies underlying the
attorney-client relationship to
determine that such a contract was
unenforceable.18 Specifically, the
Court held that this contract was
void as against public policy,
because “[r]equiring a client to pay
damages for terminating its attorney’s employment contract eviscerates the client’s absolute right to
terminate. A client should not be
deterred from exercising his or her
legal right because of economic
coercion.”19 The Court consciously
chose to uphold the client’s beneficiary rights to the detriment of the
attorney’s contractual rights: “To
force all attorney-client agreements
into the conventional status of
commercial contracts ignores the
special fiduciary relationship creat-

ed when an attorney represents a
client.”20
Yet, despite this apparent rejection of Henson’s reasoning, the
AFLAC
Court
distinguished
Henson, without expressly overruling it, by basing its decision on the
invalidity of the AFLAC contract’s
damages provision, a type of provision which the Court noted was not
involved in Henson.21 Moreover,
the Court specifically stated that it
was not addressing the employment relationship between employers and in-house counsel, as that
issue was not before the Court.22
Therefore, the AFLAC Court’s judicial restraint left unresolved what
effect, if any, its emphasis on a
client’s right to terminate its attorney without consequence has on
Henson’s contrary holding. In short,
AFLAC may cause Georgia’s inhouse counsel to wonder whether
their long-term employment contracts are enforceable.

The Conflict Between a
Client’s Beneficiary
Rights and an
Attorney’s Contractual
Rights
At its core, the conflict between
Henson and AFLAC is a conflict
between which value to uphold: a
client’s unfettered right to fire its
attorney or an employee’s right to
rely on his or her contract. The policy arguments supporting each
value are compelling.
The Georgia Supreme Court’s
articulation of the theoretical
underpinning of its holding in
AFLAC with regard to outside
counsel applies equally to in-house
counsel. The “relationship between
a lawyer and client is a special one
of trust that entitles the client to the
attorney’s fidelity.”23 In fact, the
Georgia Bar Journal
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“unique” relationship between a
client and its attorney, whether
outside counsel or in-house, is
“founded in principle upon the elements of trust and confidence on
the part of the client and of undivided loyalty and devotion on the
part of the attorney.”24 Therefore, it
would seem logical that a client
must be free to end the relationship
with its in-house counsel whenever
it “ceases to have absolute confidence in either the integrity or the
judgment or the capacity of the
attorney.”25
Courts in other jurisdictions
have expressly applied these policy
rationales to in-house counsel and
prohibited breach of contract and
other actions between companies
and their in-house counsel.26 These
courts note that permitting an
attorney to bring a breach of contract action after being fired would
intrude not only upon the right to
fire one’s attorney, but also upon
the entire fiduciary relationship of
trust that is the cornerstone of the
attorney-client relationship.27
Indeed, permitting an in-house
counsel to sue a client raises unique
problems. For example, qualifying
the right of a client to fire its attorney by subjecting the client to
potential liability for that firing
“would have a chilling effect upon
the ability of a client to exercise the
right to discharge as the cost of
exercising that right could be litigation with the former attorney.”28
Such litigation is more threatening
than typical litigation because the
attorney has had unique access to
the client’s confidential information
as a fiduciary and has an awareness
of the client’s strategies and
resources that would be protected
from any other plaintiff by the
attorney-client privilege.29 In short,
employer-clients “will be put in the
24

Courts

across

the

country,

including

Georgia, have reached different conclusions
and assessments regarding which inherent
value to uphold: the beneficiary rights of an
employer-client or the contractual rights of
an employee-attorney.
untenable position of having to rely
on outside counsel that knows less
about the [the company-client] than
does the party suing it.”30
Thus, according to this line of
reasoning, the right to terminate
the relationship is an implied term
of every employment contract
between an attorney and client.31
As the Georgia Supreme Court
held in AFLAC, “[a] client’s discharge of his attorney ‘is not a
breach of the contract of employment but the exercise of his
right.’”32 After AFLAC, clients in
Georgia may assert that this reasoning should extend to in-house
counsel as well.
By contrast, in permitting breach
of contract actions by in-house
counsel, courts in other jurisdictions have relied upon the inherent
differences between an in-house
lawyer and outside counsel, as well
as the value of upholding the right
to contract.33 In the seminal case
espousing this point of view,
General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior
Court,34 the California Supreme
Court enumerated several policy
reasons to permit in-house counsel
to bring a breach of contract claim
against a former employer-client.
For example, an in-house counsel is
economically dependent upon the
employer-client and also under
unique and powerful organizational pressures to conform the coun-

sel’s legal advice to organizational
goals.35 Moreover, the Court
asserted that the general rule permitting a client to fire an attorney
for any reason or for no reason
does not apply in every case, and it
particularly does not always apply
“without consequence.”36
Another California court permitted a breach of contract action
because it recognized that the
employment relationship between
a company and its in-house counsel
had aspects that may override the
client’s right to terminate its attorney: for example, the in-house
attorney “was a salaried employee,
required to work exclusively for the
employer. The employer had the
sole discretion to determine the
employee’s duties and to supervise
such duties.”37 Simply because the
attorney also owed ethical obligations toward his employer, asserted
the court, does not require that the
attorney lose all contractual rights
as an employee. Therefore, the
attorney should be paid upon discharge in accordance with the attorney’s contract.38 Similarly, another
court upheld an in-house attorney’s
breach of contract claim and stated
that “an employee status as an
attorney cannot excuse an employer’s violation of its contractual or
statutory obligations. Attorneys
may be unpopular, but they are not
yet fair game.”39 These courts, then,
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echoed the type of reasoning used
by the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Henson by declaring that a company could fire its in-house attorney if
it was dissatisfied, but that the
attorney did not lose the contractual right to payment for the remainder of the contract.40
In summary, courts across the
country, including Georgia, have
reached different conclusions and
assessments regarding which inherent value to uphold: the beneficiary
rights of an employer-client or the
contractual rights of an employeeattorney. Yet the battle for supremacy between these important values
does not fully consider another
aspect of these disputes that should,
but only occasionally does, play a
role in a court’s analysis.
Specifically, the danger of revealing
attorney-client confidences during
the course of a dispute between a
client and an in-house attorney is
significant. Regardless of which side
of the dispute a court supports, both
the parties and the court should be
cognizant that the true danger of
these disputes lies in their potentially destabilizing effect on the essence
of the attorney-client relationship:
the attorney’s ethical obligation to
maintain client confidences.

AN IN-HOUSE
COUNSEL’S USE
OF CLIENT CONFIDENCES IN LITIGATION AGAINST
THE CLIENT

(a) A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained
in the professional relationship
with a client, including information . . . the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing
or would likely be detrimental
to the client . . . .
(b) (1) A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph
(a) which the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
...
(iii) to establish a claim or
defense on behalf of the lawyer
in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client . . . .
(e) The duty of confidentiality shall
continue after the client-lawyer
relationship has terminated.
The comments to Rule 1.6 clarify
some of these requirements. For
example, Comment 5 confirms that
this rule applies to “all information
related to the representation, whatever its source,” not merely to matters communicated in confidence
by the client. In other words, more
than just the attorney-client privilege is protected — any of the
client’s information learned by the
attorney during his or her role as
attorney is protected from disclosure, whether or not the information also is a “privileged” communication.

At certain times, Rule 1.6 permits an attorney to disclose information “the attorney reasonably
believes necessary,” including
when necessary “to establish a
claim or defense.”41 Comment 17
to Rule 1.6 states that when a
lawyer uses confidential information to establish a claim or defense,
the lawyer “must make every effort
practicable to avoid unnecessary
disclosure of information relating
to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to
know it, and to obtain protective
orders or make other arrangements
minimizing the risk of disclosure.”
The problem in litigation, of
course, is where to draw the line
between permissible and impermissible disclosure. Once a dispute has reached the litigation
stage, it may involve a “no-holdsbarred” confrontation in which
neither party can be trusted to voluntarily maintain the lofty precepts embodied by the Rules of
Professional Conduct. In other
words, whether information is
“reasonably necessary” to assert a
claim or defense may be in the eye
of the beholder. Is the client confidence technically required to
prove an element of the breach of
contract claim or does it merely
provide the factual background of

In Georgia, the boundaries of an
attorney’s ability to use client confidences in a dispute with a former
client are set by Rule 1.6 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 1.6 provides that:
December 2003
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the employee’s dismissal? For
example, if an attorney is discharged “for cause” related to job
duties as an attorney under a longterm employment contract, then
should the attorney be permitted
to disclose purportedly confidential information to explain that a
“for cause” firing was not justified? If this is permissible, then
how does a court evaluate a case
in which an attorney claims he or
she was fired for conduct related
to a confidential situation but the
employer claims the discharge
was for reasons not related to any
confidential
situation?
The
employer would argue the attorney does not need to use confidential information to prove the
untruth of the employer’s accusations, but the attorney will assert
that it is necessary to reveal the
confidential information in order
to present the entire picture of the
relationship. Even more problematic, this argument likely will be
made “after the fact.” The attorney
may not wait to get a ruling from
the court regarding the use of the
client’s information, but may simply include the information in a
complaint.
These questions are not easily
resolved and present a dilemma
that lies beneath every dispute
between a client and its attorney,
particularly when that attorney is
an in-house lawyer who has access
to a broader swath of confidential
information than a typical outside
attorney who is retained for a specific matter. Although no Georgia
appellate court has addressed in a
reported opinion the scope of an
in-house attorney’s obligation to
maintain the confidentiality of
client information in a dispute with
a client, other courts have analyzed
this problem as integrally related to
26

the issue of whether to permit inhouse counsel to sue a client for
breach of contract in the first place.
As a result of considering the
impact of an attorney’s obligation
not to reveal confidential information, some courts present a compromise solution between the
“contract rights” emphasis in
Henson and the “beneficiary rights”
emphasis in AFLAC. These courts
permit breach of contract actions
by in-house counsel, but restrict
such claims to situations in which
the claim is related to the attorney’s
relationship with the company as
an employee, rather than as an
attorney.42 As long as the claim can
be brought “without violence to
the integrity of the attorney-client
relationship,” a breach of contract
action will be permitted by these
courts.43
For example, in Nordling v.
Northern States Power Co.,44 the
Minnesota Supreme Court permitted a breach of implied contract
claim by an in-house counsel who
was fired without the employer following the progressive disciplinary
steps required by the employee
handbook.45 According to the
Court in that case, such an action
was permitted because the firing
was not related to the employee’s
role as an attorney; rather, it was “a
case of deteriorating personal relations between an employee and his
supervisor.”46 Seemingly recognizing the line between the two moreextreme viewpoints discussed
above, the Court hinted that its
holding would be different in a
case in which the in-house attorney’s discharge was the result of a
dispute that implicated company
confidences or secrets confided to
the attorney.47 In so doing, the
Court rejected the attorney’s argument (apparently based upon

General Dynamics) that in-house
counsel ought to be treated differently because their position has
limited mobility and marketability.
“Maybe so. But it is not clear to us
that these circumstances, which
may or may not be present in a particular case, entitle in-house counsel to consideration different from
that of private attorneys. It can be
argued with equal plausibility that
many of those in private practice,
who remain subject to the quantum
meruit rule, are confronted also
with problems of mobility and
marketability.”48
Thus,
the
Nordling Court was willing to
uphold contractual rights to some
extent, but not at the expense of a
client’s beneficiary rights.
Similarly, in Kiser v. Naperville
Community Unit,49 a court in the
Northern District of Illinois upheld
the right of an in-house attorney to
bring a breach of contract action
because the client fired the attorney
before the end of his contract and
cited “cost effectiveness” as its
rationale.50 The client attempted to
argue that it had the absolute right to
fire its attorney, but the court rejected that argument.51 Stating that the
“right” asserted by the client to fire
its attorney was merely a “general”
— as opposed to an “absolute” —
right, the court permitted the breach
of contract claim to go forward
because (1) the reason for the termination was not related to the attorney-client relationship; (2) the defendant company did not argue that litigating the attorney’s claim would
force disclosure of confidential communications or that allowing such
claims generally would affect client
trust or attorney autonomy; and (3) it
appeared that the attorney’s role was
much broader than simply being an
attorney — he had administrative
duties to perform as well.52 Thus, the
Georgia Bar Journal

Kiser court attempted to balance the
two competing interests: “A client
may lose trust in and terminate his
attorney for reasons that are wholly
unrelated to the attorney’s performance and therefore insufficient to
constitute ‘cause’ under the contract.
Post-termination breach of contract
damages are generally unavailable
to the terminated attorney in such a
case, because a client must be free to
fire an attorney he does not trust.”53
Moreover, as noted above, the fact
that the dispute did not implicate
attorney-client confidences made the
court more willing to consider the
attorney’s claims.
Indeed, even the General
Dynamics Court held that a claim
by an employee-attorney should
only be brought if it can be done
without revealing any client confidences.54 Thus, the seminal case
undermining
the
client’s
“absolute” right to fire its attorney
recognized that the fiduciary relationship between the employerclient and the employee-attorney
demanded different treatment than
the typical employment dispute.
Therefore, the unique access of
in-house counsel to a client’s confidential information may require
different treatment of claims by
such attorneys against their
employer-clients. Even if a court
takes a middle ground between
Henson’s contractual rights focus
and AFLAC’s beneficiary rights
emphasis and permits limited
breach of contract claims by inhouse counsel, courts will have to
consider the possibility that such litigation may reveal a client’s confidential information. Revealing such
information in litigation potentially
could undermine the attorneyclient relationship between a company and its in-house counsel,
because companies may be wary of
December 2003

disclosing sensitive information to
their in-house attorneys if they are
concerned about it later being used
against them.
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Until the Georgia Supreme Court
resolves the uncertainties faced by
corporations and their in-house
counsel as a result of the conflicting
holdings of Henson and AFLAC,
both parties have options they can
utilize to bargain ex ante for a contractual resolution that provides
protection to the attorney’s need for
financial security and the client’s
desire to protect its confidential
information. Although it may seem
odd to resolve a dispute about
whether a contract is enforceable
by proposing a contractual solution, one must remember that the
tensions created by the fiduciary
obligations of an in-house attorney
with a long-term employment
agreement are whether the client’s
right to fire its attorney has been
infringed and whether the client’s
confidences are at risk. The suggestions below do not undermine
these rights; rather, they reinforce
them by providing up-front protections to both parties.
First, to protect client confidences, any employment agreement between a company and its inhouse counsel should have a provision requiring the attorney, in any
lawsuit the attorney brings against
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the company, to seek a protective
order upon initiating the litigation,
prior to disclosing any client information, permitting both parties to
file their pleadings under seal.
Although this procedure may be
met with resistance by the media in
highly publicized cases, it should be
noted that this exact procedure is
recommended by Comment 17 to
Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, which suggests that a
lawyer who seeks to utilize a client’s
confidences against the client in litigation “make every effort practicable” to limit the disclosure, and “to
obtain protective orders or make
other arrangements” to minimize
the risk of disclosure. The absolute
obligation of this contractual commitment should supplement the pliable language of Rule 1.6, which
permits disclosure of confidential
information if the attorney deems it
“reasonably necessary,” and only
recommends the use of protective
orders if “practicable.” A contractual provision making a protective
order mandatory would eliminate
the dangerous possibility of confidential information being revealed
improperly.
Second, in-house counsel should
attempt to receive financial security up-front as a signing bonus
rather than rely upon a tenuous
contractual commitment for a specific number of years of employment. Such up-front payments will
most likely be deemed to be a “general” retainer, which the attorney
will be able to keep even if the contractual commitment is not fulfilled.55 Moreover, a signing bonus
may be appealing to a client if the
attorney is willing to give up a contractual measure of damages
should the client terminate the contract before the end of the contract’s term. For example, rather
28

than use a long-term contract to
protect the in-house counsel, the
agreement could provide for a
signing bonus and a limited notice
period before the contract can be
terminated early. A court examining a short notice period might perceive that such a provision does not
unnecessarily burden the client’s
right to terminate its attorney in the
same manner that paying the attorney’s salary for the remaining
years on a long-term contract
might burden the client.56

CONCLUSION
An in-house attorney is an
employee and, to some degree,
deserves to have contractual protections afforded other employees.
A company is a client of its inhouse counsel and deserves to
have the right to terminate its relationship with its attorney without
suffering drastic financial consequences or facing the public exposure of its confidential information.
Balancing the rights and responsibilities of these complex and, at
times, conflicting roles can be difficult, particularly when courts
refuse to recognize the dual-roles
of each party and attempt to characterize the relationship as solely
employee-employer (as in Henson)
or attorney-client (as in AFLAC).
Until the Georgia Supreme Court
resolves
the
Henson-AFLAC
dichotomy, companies and their
in-house counsel should work
together to resolve these issues
before a dispute arises.
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